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The Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) introduced 
in 2003 a fiscally constrained ordnance procurement model 
to plan procurements of the most capable inventory of 
munitions while attempting to meet annual Navy Non-Nuclear 
Ordnance Requirements (NNOR).  AIM is the first analytical 
planning tool to incorporate fiscal constraints, to use 
true optimization to guide procurement policy, and to 
establish a quantifiable measure of overall inventory 
capability.   
This report reformulates AIM and dramatically improves 
response times for almost all instances.  We report 
analyses using AIM, involving a variety of budgeting and 
inventory scenarios.  
AIM is now a fast, flexible tool that can handle a 
wide range of budget and requirements scenarios in a manner 
that was previously impossible.  Decision makers can now 
develop a procurement plan that effectively and efficiently 
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Every year the Navy is presented with budgets and 
projected budgets for several out-years with which they 
must develop a long-term munitions procurement plan guided 
by the Navy Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements (NNOR). 
Developing an effective and efficient munitions 
procurement plan is very important for the Navy due to the 
significant investment involved and the operational 
importance of the ordnance.  A budget plan must be 
developed that maximizes the capabilities of the many types 
of munitions we purchase so that our war fighter is 
provided with the most capable and effective munitions 
inventory possible. 
U.S. Navy Non-nuclear Ordnance Requirements (NNOR) are 
established by a complex, expensive process involving many 
stakeholders in a mostly manual planning exercise.   
Decision makers currently use NNOR requirements to 
determine subjectively what munitions to purchase in order 
to provide the greatest capability for the overall 
inventory.  This is sensitive to factors ranging from 
munitions pricing to the personalities and preferences of 
the decision makers.  Such a process cannot guarantee a 
munitions procurement plan that provides the greatest 
inventory capability for the dollars invested. 
Having recognized these opportunities for improving 
NNOR planning, Major John Bruggeman developed the 
Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) in 2003.  AIM is a 
 xiv
simple and straightforward tool with which to develop 
reliable and objective procurement decisions.   
Bruggeman uses tier levels to break each weapons class 
into discrete levels of capability; this provides 
meaningful summaries of inventories, and allows for 
insightful analyses using well-known and accepted methods 
such as “stoplight diagrams.”  
AIM is a versatile and powerful planning tool.  
However, AIM requires a relatively long computational 
cycle.  To develop an estimate that can be certified to be  
within 20% of the best possible optimal solution requires a 
runtime of more than an hour on a fast desktop computer.  
While this is much faster than the current manual 
procurement process (which can take days or even months and 
never yield a provably optimal solution), it does not lend 
itself to extensive experimentation.   
We present a reformulation that executes more quickly 
and provides more precise output.  This supports multiple 
runs to explore alternate munitions planning options.  It 
also encourages decision makers to explore the impact of 
changing munitions and mission priorities. 
We have discovered that the long AIM solution times 
can be explained by the original tier level definitions of 
AIM. Tier levels have been restricted to be expressed in 
integer values.  We reformulate tier levels as a piecewise 
linear function of munition inventory.  This makes AIM 
significantly faster, and it provides better guarantees of 
optimality than its predecessor.   
 xv
Our reformulation of the model is an unquestioned 
success in terms of speed.  However, we must also ensure 
the recommendations from the model remain valid and 
comparable to that of its predecessor in terms of overall 
improvement in munitions capability.  To do this we compare 
the capabilities of nineteen test munitions at the end of 
an eight-year planning period as generated using the 
original AIM model and our reformulation.  The results show 
different munitions are recommended in various years of the 
plan, but overall the end results of the two models are 
comparable.  The overall measurement of munitions 
capability, the minimum tier level across all munitions, is 
consistently higher in the reformulated model. 
We illustrate the usefulness of our new reformulation 
with four hypothetical examples.  In the first scenario we 
examine a case where a particular weapon has a beginning 
inventory suddenly dropped to zero.  When compared to the 
baseline procurement plan (level procurement funding 
throughout the planning horizon and a given level of 
maintenance funding), we observe an increased number of 
procurements earlier in the eight-year plan as one would 
logically expect in order to attempt to replenish stock to 
satisfy NNOR. 
Next, we consider a scenario where some portion of the 
procurement budget is moved into the budgeting out-years.  
While the total budget over the eight-year period remains 
constant, funding has been shifted from each of years one 
through four to years five through eight.  Here we see 
that, compared to the baseline, munitions capability, as 
 xvi
measured by tier level achieved, lags behind the baseline, 
level funding plan. 
The third scenario considers a case where procurement 
funding is higher early in the planning years, essentially 
the opposite of our second scenario.  Here funds are moved 
from the last three years of the budget to the first three.  
The resulting plan is surprising in that it shows no 
noticeable improvement in capability during the early years 
despite increased funding.  While not what we expected, 
such a result is useful in that it might trigger the 
decision maker to look further into the scenario to 
determine if other factors might be affecting the plan.  In 
this case, the model saves the earlier money to make a 
larger purchase in middle years, when it can have more 
impact on overall capability. 
The final scenario we examine contains a year one 
spike in maintenance funding.  We observe no dramatic 
effect, overall, other than a more gradual capability 
increase over the baseline plan.  A logical next step with 
this scenario might be to conduct a sensitivity analysis on 
the level of funding increase to determine how large such 
an increase must be to have a significant affect on 
capability.  Such an analysis can now be easily done given 
the improved speed of our model. 
We have developed an improved version of AIM that, 
combined with a user-friendly spreadsheet interface, 
provides the decision maker an easy to use, extremely fast 
and accurate tool with which to explore multiple budgetary 
and requirements scenarios with minimal time and effort.  
The end result provides the decision maker with a 
 xvii
quantitative approach for addressing the ordnance 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Munitions procurement is a long-term planning problem 
and, as such, the Navy is presented with budgets and 
projected budgets for several years with which to develop a 
long-term procurement plan around the Navy Non-Nuclear 
Ordnance Requirements (NNOR). NNOR provides official 
Department of the Navy (DoN) estimates of munitions 
requirements which are then to be used in developing 
procurement budgets [OPNAVINST 8011.9A, 1989].  Frequently, 
these budgets are significantly lower than what would be 
required to purchase all weapons recommended. 
Munitions procurement is a very important problem for 
DoN as well as the entire Department of Defense (DoD) due 
to the dollars involved and the military importance of the 
commodity with which we are dealing.  The DoN weapons 
procurement budget this year is in excess of $2B [DoN 
Report, 2005] and covers approximately 48 weapons classes.  
An effective budget plan must be developed that maximizes 
the capabilities of the multiple munitions we purchase so 
that the war fighter at the tip of the spear is provided 
with the most capable and effective munitions inventory 
possible within unavoidable fiscal limitations. 
1. Current Method 
U.S. Navy non-nuclear ordnance requirements are 
established by a complex, expensive and labor intensive 
process.  NNOR involves multiple stakeholders in a process 
that   is   primarily   manual.    NNOR   ignores   budget  
2 
restrictions.  This leads to recommendations that are, most 
likely, completely unachievable when budgets are eventually 
set. 
Once NNOR requirements are established, the 
procurement process as it exists now is driven by highly-
subjective allocation priorities.  For example, the first 
priority is to replace unexpected expenditures from the 
previous year.  The next consideration is given to expected 
expenditures for the current year based on projections from 
NNOR.  At this stage providing munitions for training is 
generally the first consideration.  After that, minimum 
production quantities are considered in order to maintain 
the industrial base.  Should there be funds remaining at 
that point, munitions that are farthest from their desired 
inventory levels are targeted for procurement [Fahringer, 
2003].   
In the present system, decision makers take the NNOR 
requirements and determine subjectively what munitions to 
purchase in order to provide the greatest capability for 
the overall inventory.  Obviously, this process is 
extremely sensitive to factors ranging from munitions 
pricing to the personalities and preferences of the 
decision makers involved.  Such a process will not 
necessarily provide the Navy with the most capable 
munitions procurement plan, especially in the absence of an 
agreed-upon measure of capability.  There is no single, 
monolithic justification for the plan as a whole, it simply 
emerges as a set of allocations with scant justification 




2. Assessment and Investment Model  
The Assessment and Investment Model (AIM) [Bruggeman, 
2003] seeks to improve munitions planning.  AIM provides 
the decision maker with a simple and relatively 
straightforward tool with which to develop reliable and 
objective procurement decisions.  The procurements 
suggested by AIM are optimal or near-optimal for a measure 
of effectiveness that is based on mission capability and 
priorities agreed upon by decision makers.  In contrast to 
the current method of procurement planning, AIM is a 
prescriptive model that utilizes a detailed mathematical 
optimization model (see Appendix) to arrive at an optimal 
munitions procurement plan. 
A central concept of the AIM formulation is that of 
procurement tiers; a clear and objective measure of 
inventory capability.  Bruggeman uses tier levels to break 
the weapons classes into levels of capabilities that allow 
for insightful analysis using well-known, accepted methods 
such as stoplight diagrams.  
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
AIM requires a relatively long computational cycle.  
To develop an estimate that is provably within 20% of the 
optimal solution requires a runtime of more than an hour on 
a fairly powerful desktop computer.  While this much faster 
than the current manual system (which can take days or even 
months and never yields a provably optimal solution), it 
does not lend itself to experimentation.   
We seek a reformulation that executes more quickly and 
provides more precise output.  This would support multiple 
runs to explore several alternate munitions planning 
4 
options.  It would also encourage decision makers to assess 
the impact of changes to mission priorities, budgets, etc. 
We concentrate on reformulating the tier level 
constraints and variables and, ultimately their 
implementation in the General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) [Brooke Kendrick, and Meeraus, 1998].  Bruggeman 
expresses the tier level of a munition as a whole number.  
We suspect this artificial restriction is unnecessary and 
needlessly complicates the calculations of the model 
without adding insight into the problem.  We relax this 
integrality restriction, thus allowing munitions capability 
to fall in a continuous band between the lower and upper 
limits of the tiers as determined by the end user.  This 
























II. MODEL MODIFICATION 
A. TIER LEVEL REFORMULATION  
1. Tier Level Description 
A central feature of AIM is a tier level that provides 
both the model and decision maker with a clear and 
objective measure of inventory capability.  As shown in 
Table 1, the NNOR Total Munition Requirement (TMR) is 
composed of four mission areas; Training and Testing, 
Current Operations/Forward Presence, Combat and Strategic 
Readiness.  Each weapon class is assigned a primary, 
secondary, and a tertiary mission, and, based on the total 
number of that weapon in inventory, a letter grade is 
assigned, see Table 2, based on how much of each mission is 
covered for that weapon.  Assigned grades represent the 
increasing capability of specific munitions as their 
inventory increase as illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
TMR = TTR  + CO/FPR + CR + SRR  
Table 1.   NNOR components 
The NNOR Total Munition Requirement (TMR) 
consists of the Training and Testing Requirement 
(TTR), Current Ops/Force Protection Requirement 
(CO/FPR), Combat Requirement (CR), and Strategic 











Inventory (as a % of 
Mission Requirement)
  Level F (None) 0% 
  Level E (Basic) 40% 
   Level D(Intermediate) 50% 
     Level C (Advanced) 60% 
Level B (Superior) 70% 
  Level A (Full) 100% 
 
Table 2.   Mission Capability Scores 
The capability provided by a munition inventory 
is represented by a series of discrete jumps in 




















 Figure 1.   Mission Capability Score as a function 
of Inventory Count 
A typical relationship between the mission-
related capability score of a munition and the 
inventory count as a proportion of TMR 
illustrates reduced marginal utility at the 




The letter grade in each of the three missions led 
Bruggeman to derive the tier levels shown in Table 3.  
Essentially, each of the 16 tier levels proposed by 
Bruggeman corresponds to a specific total number of weapons 
of that class. 
Mission Areas Tier 
Level Primary Secondary Tertiary
Treaty 
Requirement 
1 F F F A 
2 E F F A 
3 D F F A 
4 D E F A 
5 D E E A 
6 C E E A 
7 C D E A 
8 C D D A 
9 B D D A 
10 B C D A 
11 B C C A 
12 A C C A 
13 A B C A 
14 A B B A 
15 A A B A 
16 A A A A 
  
Table 3.   Tier level formulation. 
The capability of a particular munition 
progresses through the tier levels as inventory 
satisfies a greater portion of each of its 
assigned mission areas. (From [Bruggeman, 2003]) 
 
The correspondence between tier levels and inventory 
numbers depends on the specific weapon and its individual 
mission requirements by mission area (as determined by 
NNOR).  As the inventory level of a particular munition 
increases to the point of satisfying a greater part of its 
mission requirements, the weapon is assigned a higher 
letter grade ranging from a low of “F” to a high of “A”.  
The  combination  of  qualifications  in  each mission area  
7 
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provides for an overall evaluation of an individual 
munition’s capability that is expressed in a tier level 
designation.  
Tier levels appear in the AIM objective function, as 
AIM seeks to maximize the minimum tier level achieved 
across the spectrum of munitions.  
2. Cumulative Design 
The tier level constraints of the Bruggeman model 
found in (equations 24 through 28 of the Appendix) rely on 
a binary variable, CUM_TIER_REACHEDm,ty, that records when 
the inventory level of a munition reaches or exceeds a 
certain tier level.   
This approach, while simple and very useful, restricts 
tier levels to integer values only.  Though the capability 
of a munition might actually lie between one tier 
breakpoint and another, it would only be recorded at the 
lower of the two.   
Because tier levels are an artificial construct, the 
requirement that we only recognize achievement of integer 
levels seems overly restrictive.   
3. Piecewise Linear Design 
Bruggeman[2003] recognizes this deficiency and 
suggests relaxing the integrality restriction.  He 
conjectures that this will dramatically improve solution 
times.   
Given both time and opportunity, we have pursued this 
relaxation.  This requires a reformulation of the four tier 
level constraints of Bruggeman and the addition of a fifth 
constraint to accurately model the tier structure.  The new 
formulation combines each tier level segment into a 
piecewise linear function.  This is achieved by introducing 
variables and equations for each munition that allow the 
exact fractional tier level to be calculated by creating a 
convex combination of the two proximate tier level 
breakpoints the current inventory lies between. 
Figure 2 illustrates integer tier levels and our 
























Figure 2.   Tier breakpoints: Integer tier levels 
 
The dotted stepwise function shows integer tier 
levels, while the piecewise linear function 
continuously interpolating between tier level 
breakpoints shows our relaxation. 
 
The discretized tier levels hide any benefit of small 
increases in inventory toward the next breakpoint; AIM only 
credits discrete jumps into a higher tier. 
9 
We replace the binary variables that cumulatively 
calculate tier levels with a new set of non-negative 
continuous variables to represent partial fulfillment of 
tiers.  These new variables, λi, are multipliers for 
creating a convex combination of adjacent tier level 
breakpoints and, thus, identify exactly where inventory 

















Figure 3.   Piecewise linear concept 
An inventory of 27 weapons lies midway within a 
tier bounded by 26 and 28 weapons.  Rather than 
credit this with 7, (the score of the lower 
complete tier breakpoint), we interpolate and use 
the intermediate score of 7.5. 
 
For tier i we have i i i 1 i 1 i i i 1 i 1f ( x x ) f (x ) f (x )+ + + +λ + λ ≡ λ + λ where iλ  + 
 = 1 and setting  and i 1+λ iλ i 1+λ  appropriately (i.e. based on 
x) yields the correct value for .   f (x)
In Figure 3 the current number of munitions, x, is 27.  
The closest breakpoints are 3X 26=  and 4X 28=  ; x lies 
10 
halfway between these breakpoints so we have 3
1 1x X X
2 2




λ = , 4 12λ = , and the resulting capability is halfway 
between the two respective tier levels: 
3 4
1 1 1f (X ) f (X ) (7 8) 7.5
2 2 2
+ = + = .  Figure 4 illustrates how Figure 2 
changes using the piecewise linear interpolation vice 
























Figure 4.   Tier breakpoints: Continuous 
interpolated tier levels 
Given some inventory quantity, each proximate 
pair of breakpoints is used to linearly 
interpolate a tier score. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF REFORMULATED CONSTRAINTS AND VARIABLES 
1. Deleted Variables 
We no longer need to use the CUM_TIER_REACHEDm,ty





2. New Variables 
Our reformulation of AIM requires the addition of 
three new variables.   
TIER_ACHIEVEDm,y Tier level achieved by munition m 
in year y. In our formulation, 
this is now a continuous, non-
negative variable that identifies 
the capability of a munition 
inventory. 
LAMBDAm,t,y A continuous, non-negative 
variable representing the weight 
placed on tier breakpoint t and 
used to calculate the exact 
capability position of a munition 
whose inventory level lies 
between two integer breakpoint 
tier levels t and t+1. 
TIER_INDICATORm,t,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
is in tier t in year y. This 
variable locates the munition 
capability within a tier level 
range.  Combined with the 
breakpoint weights, the exact 
capability of the munition 
inventory can then be identified. 
 
3. Deleted Constraints 
The constraints given below and identified in the 
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⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∑  MIN_TIE 2 , -1,
+CUM_TIER_REACHED ,'1',m y              (27) 
 ∀m,y 
4. New Constraints 
We add the following constraints. 
       (1) 
 ∑ACTIVE_INV = (LAMBDA * _ ), , ,
t
tier lvlm y m t y m t y
∀m,y   
    ∑TIER_ACHIEVED = (LAMBDA * ( )), , ,
t
ord tm y m t y         (2) 
∀m,y   
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y              (3) ≤MIN_TIER  TIER_ACHIEVED ,y m
∀m,y   
                (4) ∑ LAMBDA = 1 , ,t m t y
∀m,y   
    ≤ +LAMBDA  TIER_INDICATOR  + TIER_INDICATOR  , , , , , 1,m t y m t y m t y     (5) 
                ∀m,t,y  
                t<num_tiers 
    ∑ ∑≤LAMBDA   TIER_INDICATOR   , , , ,t tm t y m t y         (6) 
∀m,y  
                t=num_tiers 
 
5. Discussion of New Constraints 
(1) A constraint determines the LAMBDA multiplier 
used for munition m in year y and applied to the 
general capability level of the munition.   
(2) A constraint determines the tier leveling terms 
of the LAMBDA multipliers for munition m and tier 
t. 
(3) For each munition in each year, a constraint 
identifies the minimum capability tier achieved. 
(4) For any given munition in a given year, the sum 
of the LAMBDA variables must equal 1.  This 
constraint allows for fractional solutions. 
(5) Sets an upper limit on LAMBDA for a particular 
munition m and tier t. 
(6) Sets an upper limit on LAMBDA for the top tier.  
This constraint is required in addition to (5) to 
ensure the final tier is accounted for as there 
is only one break point in the top tier, that 
being the lower level.  
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND APPLICATION 
A. DATA AND SCENARIOS 
The munitions data used in Section B of this Chapter 
was originally provide by Naval Operational Logistics 
Support Center (NOLSC), formerly Naval Ammunition Logistics 
Center (NALC), in Bruggeman [2003, Appendix A].  While the 
munitions data is based on real world data, the starting 
inventories have been altered by NOLSC from the original, 
classified, numbers.  Procurement and maintenance budget 
parameters used are shown in Table 4 and are similar to 
those used by Bruggeman.  While the maintenance figures are 
the same as used by Bruggemen, the procurement budget 
numbers are slightly increased in our application to 
account for anticipated increases in munitions procurement 
budgets in the coming years and as reflected in the 
President’s FY05 budget.  An updated discount rate of 2.53% 
is applied and is obtained from the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) website [OMB 2004].   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Procurement Budget - Upper Limit 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
Procurement Budget - Lower Limit 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125
Maintenance Budget 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Discount Rate 0.0253
Year
(all budget figures are in M$)
 
Table 4.   Budget parameters for reformulated AIM 
and original models  
 
Procurement budgets represent the portion of Navy 
Weapons Procurement budget accounted for by the 
nineteen munitions used in our work and derived 
from the President’s FY05 budget.  NOLSC 
determined the appropriate value for the nineteen 
munitions.  Maintenance budget increases due to 
increasing numbers of munitions in the inventory  
15 
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as the procurement plan is executed.  Discount 





Multiple runs of AIM show the reformulation to be 
consistently faster (by a very wide margin) than its 
predecessor.   
A typical run of the original model produces a 
procurement plan with an optimality gap (the relative 
difference between the actual capability of the solution 
and the best estimate of potential capability) of 50% in 
approximately forty minutes.  The reformulated AIM 
generates a solution in less than two minutes with an 
optimality gap of 15%.  To reach a 15% optimality gap with 
the old model typically requires a run of over two hours.    
Using comparable optimality gaps, this increase 
represents a 98% reduction in computational time.  
Additionally, the increased speed allows for optimality 
bounds to be tightened even further yet still retain 
reasonable solve times.  In the scenario used here, it is 
possible to produce a solution with an optimality gap of 
10% in just under ten minutes. 
2. Output Validity 
We also want to ensure the output of the model is 
still valid and comparable to that of the original in terms 
of overall improvement in munitions capability.  To do this 
we compare the capabilities of the nineteen munitions at 
the end of the eight-year planning period as generated 
using the original model versus that from reformulated AIM.  
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate this comparison and highlight 
the fact that, though different munitions are sometimes 
emphasized for improvement, overall the output of the two 
models is comparable.  But, the overall measurement of 
munitions capability, the minimum tier level over all 





















































































































Figure 5.   Comparison of original AIM and the  
reformulated model relative inventories at 
the end of Year 8 
 
The relative inventory levels after eight years 
are shown for each weapon as calculated by 
original AIM and our reformulated version.  While 
the original formulation shows measurably higher 
inventories (greater than 5%) for six of the 
munitions, the reformulated model is equal to or 
better in the remaining thirteen munitions.  
Also, the minimum is better in the reformulated 
model (GBU-12 at 81% vs. Tomahawk RGM109D at 78% 









































































































 Figure 6.   Comparison of original AIM and 
reformulated model tier levels after eight 
years 
 
Comparing the tier levels achieved between the 
two models gives another indication of the 
validity of the reformulation.  The original 
formulation generally does slightly better on an 
individual basis but overall the reformulated 
model has a higher minimum tier level (JDAM at 12 
in the reformulated model vs. Tomahawk 109D at 11 
in the original model).  As our objective with 
this model is to maximize the minimum tier level, 
this indicates that we have done better in this 
regard (though original AIM may be able to 
achieve the same level but has not due to the 
integrality gap of its solution) in addition to 
greatly increased speed of computation. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The ability to bring down the upper bounds in our 
solution to the point of achieving a fifteen or ten percent 
gap in less than ten minutes is significant.  Not only do 
we gain the direct benefit of reduced execution time, we 
can also be more confident in the quality of the solution. 
C. APPLICATION OF REFORMULATED MODEL 
18 
The ability to quickly produce accurate solutions 
allows for the study of various budgeting and procurement 
scenarios in a very short period of time.  Such flexibility 
19 
provides the decision maker with a powerful tool with which 
to explore various alternatives with respect to procurement 
or maintenance funding, munitions mixes, or industrial base 
issues.   
To highlight the capabilities of the new model we 
explore several procurement scenarios and their effect on 
munitions procurement plans. 
We refer to the munitions data as previously given in 
the base case and then note excursions in each scenario.  
All parameters and planning factors are notional, 
unclassified and developed solely for these scenarios. 
1. Critical Munitions Restock  
In the first scenario we examine a case where a 
particular weapon, in our case the MK82, has a beginning 
inventory suddenly drop to zero.  Figures 7 and 8 show the 
base case procurement plan for this munition given the 
default beginning inventory numbers for the MK82.  In the 
base case, we observe a drop in capability in year three.  
This is due to large deliveries of previously purchased 
munitions in years one and two and practically none in year 
three.  Alongside the base case is the modified procurement 
plan that results from a beginning inventory level of zero.  
One can clearly see the shift in procurements to the 



















Figure 7.   Comparison of normal initial inventory 
procurement plan versus single munition 
restock plan 
 
The procurement policy for base case inventory 
levels is shown along with the required plan if a 
single munition inventory drops to zero at the 
beginning of the planning horizon.  One sees the 
expected shift in procurement to earlier in the 























Figure 8.   Comparison of overall munitions 
capability for base case inventory versus 
overall capability accounting for MK82 
complete restock 
 
The effect on the overall inventory due to the 
need to restock MK82 inventory from zero is 
visible here.  Resources must be shifted to raise 
the MK82 capability which then drags the minimum 
overall capability down accordingly.  The two 
plans achieve equality again in years six and 
seven. 
 
2. Deferred Procurement Budget  
21 
Total funding for this scenario, $10B, remains the 
same for both funding plans.  Funding for years one-
through-four are reduced by $250M per year while years 
five-through-eight are increased by this same amount.  One 
can easily see in Figure 9 the impact such a funding 
decision would have. While total capability is the same 
under either plan at the end of the eighth year, total 
inventory capability lags by two years with a very 
pronounced gap at the end of the fifth year.  These results 

















Figure 9.   Comparison of base case funding plan 
versus delayed funding 
 
With constant funding of $1.125B per year the 
minimum tier level is up to 11 by the end of year 
five, compared to tier 5 if some funding is 
delayed.   
  
  
3. Front-Loaded Procurement Budget 
Our third scenario considers a case where procurement 
funding is higher early in the planning years.  For this 
scenario we decremented years four through six $250M each 
and distributed those funds equally among years one through 
three.  We see the results of such a policy displayed in 
Figure 10 below along with the level funding plan.  In 
something of a surprise we see no benefit in overall tier 
level capability for the early years despite the shift in 
funding.  No real advantage is gained until year four but 
that is soon erased in year five and beyond. 
22 
This is a useful scenario in that the model has 
provided a non-intuitive insight: more funding early might 
not help as much as might be thought. It appears that the 
level of funding added in this scenario is insufficient to 
create a significant change in inventory capability.  As 
with the earlier scenarios this one produced a solution in 


















Figure 10.    Comparison of base case plan versus 
advanced funding 
 
The graph displays the effect of a base case plan 
versus a hypothetical plan that shifts some 
funding from years four through six to years one 
through three.  It appears not enough funding was 
shifted in this scenario to show significant 
benefit in overall inventory capability.  
 
4. Onetime Maintenance Increase 
The final scenario we examine contains a one-time 
spike in maintenance funding early in the procurement plan.  
We want to see what affect, if any, such a change would 
have on the overall procurement plan.   
We choose to increase maintenance funding in the first 
year from $30M to $100M.  Figure 11 shows us that such a 
23 
change has no dramatic effect other than to bring the total 
munitions capability up in a more gradual manner than with 
the base case funding plan.  This is probably due to minor 
differences in the integer programming enumeration; in 
terms of the objective function, it is not a significantly 
better result. 
This is a counter-intuitive result but one that might 
be explained by the relatively small number of munitions in 
the maintenance pipeline for the first three years of the 
procurement plan.  Lacking sufficient munitions requiring 
maintenance on which to spend additional budget, no 


















Figure 11.   Comparison of base case plan versus 
level funding with a one-time maintenance 
increase 
 
The one-time increase in maintenance funding 
occurs in year one of the plan and seems to have 
little impact at this level of increase.  Overall 
performance is only slightly improved, and 
actually lags behind in the out-years. 
24 
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IV. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
Ordnance procurement planning is an extremely 
important problem for the U.S. Navy and the entire 
Department of Defense.  It is a complex, multi-billion 
dollar problem that, until AIM, was not addressed optimally 
in a quantitatively measurable or financially constrained 
way.  
AIM is a major step forward in addressing this 
problem, and we have significantly improved its 
computational speed.   
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Many aspects of AIM and the problem of ordnance 
procurement planning remain as productive areas for further 
research.  While we concentrate on adding greater 
efficiency and detail to the model with respect to tier 
level formulation a similar focus could be applied to other 
components as well.   
The industrial base portion of the model is a prime 
candidate for further research.  AIM does a reasonable job 
of modeling this portion of the problem but far more detail 
exists in describing the manufacturing processes.  In 
reality munitions are manufactured through a complex multi-
component process that often involves several manufacturing 
sites around the country.  Individual vendors have multiple 
munitions sharing facilities, and avoiding the “vanishing 
vendor” problem introduces other difficulties.  These and 
other  complexities  in  the  industrial base have a direct  
26 
impact on the economics of ordnance procurement planning 
and, therefore increased fidelity would certainly be of 
value. 
Ordnance maintenance is another segment of the model 
that, due to its complexity, could benefit from further 
development.  Maintenance costs and requirements are prime 
drivers in ordnance management and a greater understanding 
of exactly how that portion of the real world system 
functions could yield substantial improvement in how such 
characteristics are modeled in AIM. 
Bruggeman developed a fast heuristic solver. We have 
chosen to forgo revising the heuristics because our integer 
linear program is now so much faster.  A revised heuristic 
completely contained in, say, Microsoft Excel, would still 
be of value for the typical decision maker, and would make 
the application available to a far wider audience thus 





APPENDIX. BRUGGEMAN AIM MODEL FORMULATION  
The following formulation and write up are taken 
directly from [Bruggeman 2003]. 
 
A. INDICES AND SETS 
m∈M  Munition, any munition for which NNOR 
requirements are generated, currently this is 190 
possible munitions 
y∈Y Year of the planning horizon, y={1,...,|Y|~8} 
t∈T Tier level, T={1,...,num_tiers} 
l∈L Procurement pricing lot, l={1,...,|L|~10}, there 
may be up to ten different pricing lots 
identified for each munition 
f∈F Munition facility, F={1,...,fmax} where fmax is the 
total number of facilities being modeled 
 
B. DATA 
num_lotsm Number of procurement pricing 
lots actually used for munition m 
lot_countm,l Number of munition m in lot l 
lot_costm,l Procurement cost for the full 
quantity of lot l of munition m 
unit_costm,l Unit cost per munition m in lot 
l.  Every munition must have at 
least two lots.  For all m, 
lot_countm,’1’=0, and lot_costm,’1’ 
is the penalty charged for 
violating the minimum sustaining 
27 
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rate for production.  Subsequent 
lot counts and costs represent 
price reductions due to quantity 
purchasing.  Counts and costs are 
cumulative; use these values as 
you would a table (interpolating 
linearly between given values) to 
determine the total cost for a 
desired quantity 
mun_facilitym,f Value of 1 indicates munition m 
is produced at production 
facility f and maintained at 
maintenance facility f’, 0 
required otherwise 
min_sust_ratem Minimum production Sustaining 
Rate (MSR) for munition m 
max_prod_ratem Maximum Production Rate (MPR) for 
munition m 
prev_procurem,y Number of munition m to be 
delivered in year y from previous 
procurements (before beginning of 
AIM planning horizon) 
init_inventm Initial on-hand inventory of 
munition m at the beginning of 
the planning horizon 
delivery_delaym Number of years delay for 
delivery of new procurements of 
munition m 
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init_maint_duem,y Number of munition m in the 
initial inventory due for 
maintenance in year y 
maint_cyclem Time between scheduled 
maintenance for munition m, if no 
routine maintenance is required, 
this value must be large (>8) 
maint_costm Unit cost of maintenance for 
munition m 
maint_delaym Number of years to return a 
maintained weapon m to the active 
inventory 
max_maint_ratem Maximum annual maintenance rate 
for munition m 
min_maint_ratem Minimum annual maintenance 
sustaining rate for munition m 
expend_trngm,y Expected annual training 
expenditures for munition m in 
year y 
expend_opsm,y Estimated annual operational 
expenditures for munition m in 
year y 
proc_budget_lowy Lower bound for annual 
procurement budget band in year y 
proc_budget_uppy Upper bound for annual 
procurement budget band in year y 
maint_budgety Upper bound for annual 
maintenance budget in year y 
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disc_rate 8-year discount rate for future 




linearly interpolated between 
given values   
mpr_lotm For munition m, lot number into 
which MPR falls 
msr_lotm For munition m, lot number into 
which MSR falls 
mpr_costm Cost for the MPR quantity of 
munition m 
msr_costm Cost for the MSR quantity of 
munition m 
max_prod_costf Max annual production output of 
facility f, in total production 
costs 
min_sust_costf Min annual production output to 
sustain facility f, in total 
production costs 
msr_penf Monetary penalty for violation of 
facility f’s MSR 
mpr_pen_ratef Proportional additional penalty 
cost to facility f for exceeding 
its MPR 
max_maint_costf Max annual maintenance output of 
facility f, in total maintenance 
costs 
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min_maint_costf Min annual output to sustain 
maintenance facility f, in total 
maintenance costs 
excess_maint_rate Proportional increase in 
maintenance costs for exceeding 
the maximum maintenance rate 
persist 1 if this is to be solved as a 
persistent solution 
cold2hot 1 to prohibit cold facilities 
from going hot in a designated 
number of years 
hot2cold 1 to prohibit hot facilities from 
going cold in a designated number 
of years 
cold2hot_time Number of years to enforce cold 
to hot constraint 
hot2cold_time Number of years to enforce hot to 
cold constraint 
change_limit 1 to enforce restrictions on 
changes in procurement quantities 
by year 
change_percenty Limit, as a percentage, to the 
allowable change in procurements 
of each munition, from the 
incumbent solution, in year y 
num_procm,y Number of munition m procured in 
year y in the incumbent solution 
of_wtsy Objective function weights, by 
year y 
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holding_penaltym Objective function penalty for 
"holding" a munition m in 
maintenance rather than 
performing the maintenance 
budget_penaltyy Objective function penalty for 
underspending the procurement 
budget lower bound in year y 
num_tiers Number of tier levels in the tier 
formulation 
tier_lvlm,t,y Number of weapons of type m in 
year y required to reach tier t 
 
C. VARIABLES 
PROCUREDm,y Number of munition m procured 
during year y 
LOT_PROCUREDm,l,y Number of munition m procured 
from lot l in year y 
PROC_COSTm,y Total cost of procurement of 
munition m in year y 
DELIVEREDm,y Number of munition m delivered 
during year y from both new 
procurement and maintenance 
ACTIVE_INVm,y Number of munition m in the 
usable inventory at the end of 
year y 
MAINT_INVm,y Number of munition m awaiting 
maintenance (not usable) at the 
end of year y 
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MAINT_DUEm,y Number of munition m due for 
maintenance during year y 
MAINT_RTNm,y Number of munition m returned 
from maintenance (again usable) 
during year y 
MAINT_SLACKf,y Maintenance throughput of 
facility f below the minimum 
maintenance sustaining rate in 
year y, in total maintenance 
costs 
MAINT_SURPLUSf,y Maintenance throughput of 
facility f above the maximum 
maintenance rate in year y, in 
total maintenance costs 
MIN_MAINT_PENf,y Monetary penalty for violation of 
the minimum maintenance rate for 
facility f in year y 
MAX_MAINT_PENf,y  Monetary penalty for violation of 
the maximum maintenance rate for 
facility f in year y 
OVERPRODf,y Value of munitions procured in 
year y from facility f above the 
value of the Max Production Rate 
MPR_PENf,y Amount of penalty paid for 
procurements in excess of MPR at 
facility f in year y 
MIN_TIERy Minimum tier achieved of all 
munitions in year y 
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SPEND_SLACKy Slack variable for spending below 
the procurement budget lower 
bound in year y 
 
PERS_SLACKm,y Slack variable for quantity of 
munition m by which persistence 
goals were not met in year y 
COLD_SLACKf,y Slack variable for persistence 
goals, a 1 indicates a failure to 
keep facility f “cold” in year y 
of the updated solution 
HOT_SLACKf,y Slack variable for persistence 
goals, a 1 indicates a failure to 
keep facility f “hot” in year y 
of the updated solution 
CUM_TIER_REACHEDm,t,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
is in tier t or below in year y 
LOT_INDICATORm,l,y Binary variable, 1 if munition m 
is being procured in lot l during 
year y 
MEET_MSRf,y Binary variable, 1 if facility f 




D. CONSTRAINTS AND OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
MAXIMIZE 
of_wts * MIN_TIER COLD_SLACK +HOT_SLACK PERS_SLACKf,y f,y
ACTIVE_INV -budget_penalty *SPEND_SLACK -holding_penalty *MAINT_INV,
,




m y y y m m,y
m y
m num tiers y
m
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min_maint_cost MAINT_SLACK - f f y
MAINT_SURPLUSf f y
TIVE_INV  = init_invent +DELIVERED, ,
subject to: 
-MAINT_DUE -expend_trng -expend_ops, , ,m y m y m y
ACTIVE_INV  = ACTIVE_INV +DELIVERED-1m,y m,ym,y
1.  
-MAINT_DUE -expend_trng -expend_ops
 , , , 'DELIVERED = prev_procure +PROCUREDm y m y m y
+MAINT_RTN
 , ,, -1MAINT_INV = MAINT_INV +MAINT_DUEm y m ym y
- ,
 , ,MAINT_DUE = init_maint_duem y m y
, '
( )*maint_cost *mun_facilityMAINT_RTN m m,fm,y ≥
m
∑
( )*maint_cost *mun_facilityMAINT_RTN m m,fm,y
,
max_maint_cost  + ,
m
≤∑
2.   ∀m, y=1 (1) 
 
  
 ∀m,y>1 (2) 
 
  tier_lvl 1ACTIVE_INV , m,'',ym y ≥  ∀m,y (3) 
 
  
 ∀m,y (4) 
  ∀y’=y-delivery_delaym  
  ∀y’’=y-maint_delaym 
 
 -, ,MAINT_INV = MAINT_DUE MAINT_RTNm y m y m y,  ∀m,y=1  (5) 
 
  
 ∀m,y>1 (6) 
 
  



























⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
∑
lot_count -lot_count * , +1,LOT_INDICATORm lm l m l y
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
lot_count -lot_count * , ,LOT_INDICATORm lm l m l y
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
tier_lvl -lot_count * , ,LOT_INDICATORm lm num_tiers y m l y⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
f f y+




, ,OT_PROCUREDm l y ≥L
,, +1
, ,LOT_PROCUREDm l y ≤
,, +1
,, ,
, ,LOT_PROCUREDm l y
⎛ ⎞
≤




















, ,MAX_MAINT_PEN =excess_maint_rate*MAINT_SURPLUSf y f y  ∀f,y (10) 
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( ) '-1PROC_COST * 1-disc_rate, '
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END_SLACK PROC_COST * 1-disc_rate
'=1
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,*OVERPROD,MPR_PEN mpr_pen_ratef y f f y=  ∀f,y (20) 
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R -CUM_TIER_REACHED2 , -1,
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t*CUM_TIER_REACHED , ,num_tiers m t y≤ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∑MIN_TIE
PROCURED /num_procm,y m,y ≥
1-change_percent -PERS_SLACK
PROCURED /num_procm,y m,y ≤
1+change_percent +PERS_SLACK
MEET_MSR num_proc *mun_facility +COLD_SLACKm,yf,y f,ym,f
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠≤ ∑m
num_proc *mun_facilitym,y m,f⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎠∑  MEET_MSR num_pmf,y
⎝
⎛⎜








If persist=1 and change_limit=1 and change_percenty>0, 
  
 ∀m,y (28) 
 
If persist=1 and change_limit=1 and change_percenty>0, 
  
 ∀m,y (29) 
 
If persist=1 and cold2hot=1 and cold2hot_time>y, 
  
 
 ∀f,y (30) 
 
If persist=1 and hot2cold=1 and hot2cold_time>y, 
 
 ∀f,y (31) 
 
PROCUREDm,y, LOT_PROCUREDm,l,y, PROC_COSTm,y, DELIVEREDm,y, 
ACTIVE_INVm,y, MAINT_INVm,y, MAINT_DUEm,y, MAINT_RTNm,y, 
MAINT_SLACKf,y, MAINT_SURPLUSf,y, MIN_MAINT_PENf,y, 
MAX_MAINT_PENf,y, OVERPRODf,y, MPR_PENf,y, MIN_TIERy, 
SPEND_SLACKy, PERS_SLACKy, 
COLD_SLACKy, HOT_SLACKy ≥ 0 ∀m,y,t,l (32) 
 
CUM_TIER_REACHEDm,t,y, LOT_INDICATORm,l,y, 
 MEET_MSRf,y are Binary ∀m,y,t,l (33)  
 
E. DESCRIPTION 
The objective function expresses the weighted sum of 
the annual minimum tier achieved, less penalties for 
violations of persistence, plus the sum of annual 
inventories as a proportion of the total desired inventory, 




(1-2) Together, these are inventory balance equations 
for each active (combat useable) munition. 
(3) Each constraint requires that the minimum active 
inventory of a munition be maintained every 
year. 
(4) Each constraint determines the number of a newly 
produced or maintained munition that is 
delivered in a given year. 
(5-6) Together, these are inventory balance equations 
for a unusable munition that is waiting for 
maintenance. 
(7) Maintenance scheduling equations; these 
determine the number of a munition that are due 
for maintenance in a given year. 
(8-9)  These elastic constraints enforce the 
maintenance base for the minimum and maximum 
maintenance throughput, in cost, in a given year 
for a given facility.  A violation 
(MAINT_SLACKf,y and MAINT_SURPLUSf,y) results in 
an increased maintenance cost. 
(10-11) These equations determine the penalties for a 
violation of a maintenance base constraint. 
(12) Each constraint limits cumulative maintenance 
spending (including penalties) by the cumulative 
maintenance budget.   
(13) This equation determines the total number of a 
munition procured in a given year by summing 
procurements over all individual lots. 
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(14-16) Together, these constraints require that an 
individual lot procurement is no larger in count 
than the count of the entire lot (or the NNOR 
total requirement when purchasing from the last 
lot) and that a munition may not be procured 
from the next lot without procuring the entire 
previous lot. 
(17) Each elastic constraint restricts procurement 
production at a facility by the maximum 
production rate (MPR).  A violation (OVERPRODf,y) 
results in a penalty which increases procurement 
cost. 
(18-19) Together, these constraints determine whether 
the minimum sustaining production rate (MSR) for 
a facility has been met.  A failure to meet the 
MSR results in a penalty on overall procurement 
spending. 
(20) Each equation determines the penalty for a 
violation of a facility’s MPR. 
(21) Each equation determines the total cost of new 
procurement of a single munition in a given 
year. 
(22-23) Together these constraints enforce the upper and 
lower bounds on cumulative procurement budget 
spending, discounted for future years and 
including penalties. 
(24-25) Together, these constraints determine which tier 
has been reached based on a current (active) 
inventory count. 
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(26) These constraints require the tier reached 
indicator variable to be non-decreasing. 
(27) Each constraint determines the minimum tier 
achieved in a given year. 
(28-29) These constraints are active only when a 
persistent recommendation is desired.  Together 
they require the quantity of a munition procured 
in a given year to be within a relative range of 
the quantity from the original recommendation. 
(30-31) These elastic constraints require that a 
facility does not change status in the revised 
plan from “cold” to “hot” or “hot” to “cold” for 
a designated number of years.  A violation 
(COLD_SLACKf,y and HOT-SLACKf,y) is penalized in 
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